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Interests and Harms in Primate Research
Nathan Nobis, Morehouse College

Sughrue and colleagues (2009) claim to offer a “balanced examination of the ethics of primate stroke
research” (3). While there is some “balance” in their discussion in that they present some arguments for
its moral permissibility and some arguments for its wrongness, they do not fulfill their promise to
“elucidate the many ethical arguments for and against this type of research” (3, emphasis added).
Perhaps they believe that greater comprehensiveness is unnecessary since they think they have
successfully shown that non-human primates have no, or little, interest in not being subject to stroke
experiments, are thereby not harmed by them, and therefore such experiments are morally permissible (if
not obligatory, given their alleged benefits for developing stroke therapies for humans). This appears to
be the main conclusion they wish to support. I will show that their moral arguments are in need of greater
moral defense.
It is worthwhile to mention that the target article opens with the logically irrelevant claim that “activists”
are about “Plying their trade of intimidation aimed at ending biomedical experimentation in all animals”
(Sughrue et al. 2009). This is irrelevant because, first, most “activists” do not engage in any kind of
“intimidation.” But, second and more importantly, the behavior of anyone who engages in any intimidation,
of any kind, never has bearing on the ethics of animal experimentation. By analogy, some critics of
abortion ’intimidate’ abortion providers, but nothing follows about the morality about abortion itself from
that: abortion surely would not be morally permissible because some of its critics behave (arguably)
badly. Similarly, nothing follows about the morality of animal experimentation from any activists’ behavior
because there is never any such connection for any moral issue. Some “activists” for animal
experimentation “intimidate” some animal advocates, but that does not show that animal experimentation
is wrong, as Sughrue and colleagues (2009) surely understand.
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) do not focus on ad hominem attacks on select activists, but rather
engage moral arguments that they judge to be “well stated and rational” (3). They state that some
arguments against animal use are “sensational” (3), but do not mention that the same is true for some
arguments in favor of animal use. The single argument they consider against primate experimentation
appeals to the idea of equal consideration of interests. The reasoning is this: each individual’s interests
deserve equal consideration to the comparable or similar interests of anyone else; primates have
interests in avoiding stroke and its consequences; their interests should be given comparable weight to
the similar interests of any human with a mental life similar to that primate; and, thus, since these
humans’ interests are given consideration enough such that they should not be experimented on for the
benefit of others, consistency requires that the primates not be experimented on either.
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) acknowledge that primates have some interests, including some that are
set back, violated, disrespected or compromised by stroke (and certainly are not promoted by it). They
report, “monkeys with stroke may very well experience other negative emotions following stroke, such as
distress at the feeling of being increasingly vulnerable, or the decreased ability to interact with their peers
or to manipulate objects, including food, in their environment” (3). But they claim that “if they lead to the
development of useful therapeutics for humans” (3) then “stroke experiments that take care to anticipate
the specific needs of these animals are . . . [ethical]” (3). This is because, apparently, primates are
thought to lack some other specific interest(s) that strokes would set back and so, as non-existent, need
not be given equal consideration (or even some other less-than-equal level of consideration) to any
comparable interests of any humans.

What exactly is this interest(s)? It is not an interest in avoiding pain if Sughrue and colleagues are correct
that strokes do not cause pain (3). They might also claim that it is not an interest in not suffering in certain
ways, since they argue that primates do not suffer in ways that depend on abilities for abstract thought.
But their argument here is dubious: “Because neither stroke nor the means of inducing the stroke is
associated with substantial physical pain, for an animal to suffer during the acute period, an animal must
be aware that it has a neurological deficit, and have some idea of the significance of this event” (3).
The assumption here is false: to suffer from some cause or event, one does not need to know anything
about it, conceptualize it or have an idea of its significance. A human baby might suffer from malaria (or a
stroke) and, of course, have no conception of the cause of her sufferings or her significance. Suffering
depends on one’s subjective awareness, i.e., how things seem and feel to the one who is experiencing
that mental state. Abstract thought can make a difference to that—sometimes for better and sometimes
for worse—but Sughrue and colleagues (2009) argument noted previously seems to imply that inducing
strokes in newborn humans causes no suffering, a conclusion that many would reject, if the kind of
suffering in question is taken to be necessary to deserve moral protections from such experimentation.
But not all harms are due to pain or suffering, and Sughrue and colleagues (2009) seem to argue that
primates are not significantly harmed or made worse-off by given strokes and eventually killed so their
brains can be studied. Potentially relevant here is their claim that, “If a nonhuman primate is able to
acknowledge the existence of a hemiparesis, both at baseline and following stroke, in some meaningful
way beyond that needed to alter its balance, the question we need to ask is whether they have any
meaningful insight into what having a neurological deficit means, and to what degree that understanding
might be compromised by the stroke itself” (3).
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) then argue that primates lack the mental capacities to acknowledge the
existence of a hemiparesis and lack insight and understanding of this. If this is said because this is
supposed to be a reason to think primates are not harmed by strokes—they are not made worse off than
without the stroke, their well-being not lessened, and so on—this is surely false. Again, many humans,
especially vulnerable ones (e.g., the very young and old) could not acknowledge or conceptualize a
stroke as a stroke and lack insight and understanding, but their having had a stroke is surely bad for
them, from their own point of view.
Sughrue and colleagues (2009) also claim that “because monkeys are unlikely to ‘understand’ stroke in
the way that humans do, it follows that they do not have a similar interest in avoiding stroke” (3). While
those who understand strokes might have, strictly speaking, a different interest in avoiding stroke from
those who do not understand strokes (in part, because they conceptualize the event different), it does not
follow that one’s interest in avoiding stroke is somehow weaker than the other’s: e.g., a neurologists
interest in avoid stroke is different from a plumber’s (and is different from a 2-year–old child’s), but they all
have profound interests in avoiding strokes and their consequences. And even if primates and all
humans’ interests are different, it does not follow that primates’ interests in avoiding strokes and their
consequences are not as strong as, at least, comparably minded humans. Furthermore, it does not follow
that their interests are deserving of such little consideration that experimenting on them is morally
permissible.
In conclusion, what Sughrue and colleagues (2009) call “human-like thought” (3) is held by a wide range
of individual human beings, all of which they presumably think would be wrong to induce strokes on,
without consent, for the possible benefits for others. The best strategy to begin thinking morally about
animals involves thinking about these kinds of human cases and asking what moral hypotheses best
explain why “vivisecting” these human beings would be wrong. The best answers here about human
cases, combined with general ethical theories and moral principles that Sughrue and colleagues (2009)

did not mention—rights theories and other deontologies, utilitarianisms and consequentialisms, ideal
(Rawls-inspired) contractarianisms, virtue ethics, and other moral foundations—can have surprising
implications for animal use.
What Sughrue and colleagues (2009) need to do is find and defend a morally relevant difference(s)
between the ranges of human cases and the primates: in absence of a defensible proposal on that issue,
their moral defense of primate use fails. They write that “any attempt to cure major complex diseases
without the understanding, support, and cooperation of the majority of society’s members will likely suffer
due to lack of clarity and consensus” (3) This is true, but if they believe that their article provided good
moral reasons to clarify why primate experiments are permissible—in the sense of providing sound or
cogent moral arguments in its favor—Sughrue and colleagues, like other authors, have a lot of work left to
do (Graham and Nobis 2006; Nobis 2003, 2004, 2009). 
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